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Over the past few years we have been concerned about the stock response, both 
from inside and outside government, 
to some aspects of the articulated 
International Relations agenda of 
South Africa, which is premised on a 
new utilitarian, crude economic driven 
response. Some critics go so far as to 
paint our involvement on the continent 
as purely part of a sub-imperialist 
agenda. Both domestically and abroad, 
it has been said that South Africa is 
pursuing a narrow national interest-
driven foreign policy. And because 
of this quest to promote the narrow 
national interest, decision-makers have 
made it easy for elements of South 
African capital, including champions 
of BEE, to take advantage of the access 
to opportunities provided by the role 
South Africa has been playing on 
the continent. In this aspect, foreign 
policy has become a tool for elite and 
sectarian rather than national and 
continental interests. 
While it has not necessarily been 
the intention of the South African 
International Relations department to 
function solely as a provider of such self-
interested opportunities, elites close to 
the ruling class and others see foreign 
policy as an instrument to advance 
their narrow business interests, as was 
the case in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), the Central African 
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Republic (CAR) and other countries. 
Narrow self-interest is now thinly 
disguised as “the national interest”. The 
President and the Minister of Trade and 
Industry have vowed that “South Africa 
is open for business…in a big way”. 
The unintended consequence of the 
“Open for business” strategy is that our 
international relations agenda is based 
on propping up business opportunities 
at the expense of the citizens in the 
countries on which it focuses.
To be sure, a twenty year 
assessment would suggest that there 
is more to South Africa’s foreign 
policy and diplomacy than crude 
utilitarian, self-interest drivers. We 
would support a school of thought that 
suggests that South Africa has made 
huge gains in relation to the ability of 
Africa to deal more effectively with the 
sources of violence and armed conflict 
that are at the core of poverty and 
underdevelopment. This must surely 
be the primary area of concern for all 
solidarity activists.
There have been many instances 
in which South Africa has pursued a 
foreign policy agenda that was fuelled 
on paper, and in many instances also in 
practice, by a notion of putting people 
at the centre, with a specific focus on 
Africa, on the need for solidarity, for 
acting multi-laterally, and for seeing 
peace, stability and security as the key 
pillars of its policy. South Africa has 
pushed hard for genuine partnerships 
with the outside world; not some old, 
and exploitative paternalism. 
Successive ANC led administrations 
have put the national interest driven 
idea centre stage and argued for a 
cognitive shift in which foreign policy 
is seen as an opportunity, both for 
engagement and as providing entry 
points for leveraging the progressive 
implementation of what is clearly a 
value driven international relations 
agenda, at least on the policy level. 
They went further, to argue that their 
international agenda was responding 
well to the key drivers of conflict and 
under-development on the continent, 
so it must surely have some merit. 
There is a contradiction and tension 
here that government should be 
mindful of, and seek to reconcile. 
National interest considerations should 
be there, and need to be recognised 
upfront. But this should be squared 
with important values and principles 
which the ruling party holds dear, and 
which have shaped its global standing 
for decades. 
But is South Africa really as 
committed to conflict resolution, 
development, co-operation, gover-
nance and stability as it would have 
us believe? Without attempting to give 
a comprehensive analysis of all of the 
forms of conflict currently affecting 
the African continent, this outline 
seeks to point to areas where there 
is an apparent shift in the dynamics 
of conflict, out of which new forms 
of conflict and an escalation of 
tension appear to be emerging. This 
exacerbates existing areas of ongoing 
concern.
These shifting forms of conflict 
raise particular challenges for the 
regional and continental efforts to 
build an effective African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) initiated 
by the African Union Commission. 
The gaps and challenges that have 
been identified in the responses to 
these forms of conflict have direct 
implications for the role of South Africa 
and other African states in finding a 
complementary set of strategies and 
inform the direction of the APSA. 
The conflict triggers and the gaps 
and weaknesses of current approaches 
outlined here all occur within the 
context of a continent that is still caught 
up in an ongoing cycle of protracted 
social conflict. The mediated outcomes 
that have sought to bring an end to 
violence have often not been able to 
effectively contain the residual forms 
of tension that accompany political 
and economic periods of transition. 
The effect of change processes on 
communities inevitably leads to volatile 
contexts in which local level disputes 
can quickly spiral into widespread 
forms of escalated tension and violence. 
External interventions and destabilising 
tactics used by external powers have 
served to render parts of the continent 
ungovernable in many instances. 
Several contexts across Africa 
continue to be characterised by residual 
conflicts and tension connected to 
poorly managed transitional processes, 
including mismanaged demobilisation 
and integration programmes for 
combatants, ineffective reconciliation 
efforts, inappropriate inherited colonial 
borders and an insensitive handling of 
transitional justice issues. Interventions 
in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Somalia 
and others have spread extremism and 
violence. 
While South Africa has been a 
staunch proponent of mediated and 
negotiated solutions, the Republic’s 
foreign policy has not sufficiently 
recognised the fragility of state 
institutions and structures, and how 
central these are to understanding 
why so many mediated outcomes 
do not appear to be able to prevent 
communities and national contexts 
from slipping back into recurring cycles 
of violent crisis. Post-colonial states 
have for the most part been unable to 
transform weak, ineffective and partisan 
social, economic, political and judicial 
systems, inherited from a colonial era 
of domination. In some instances the 
systems that were designed to divide 
and rule have been adapted to be 
used in post-colonial contexts for the 
purposes of maintaining control.
With millions of people living in 
poverty on the continent, growing 
economic inequality appears to be 
exacerbated by unequal economic 
development and high levels of 
unemployment. The conditions are rife 
to make people, and youth in particular, 
vulnerable to external manipulation 
by stakeholders who benefit from the 
instability and the lawlessness that often 
accompanies periods of violence. The 
devastating effect of war and violence 
on the webs of social relationships that 
enable human agency compounds 
the complexity of this challenge. The 
impact of violence has also had specific 
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and different long-term debilitating 
effects on men, women and children.
Sections of the population are often 
manipulated by those who seek to take 
advantage of ethnic differences or to 
use polarised party political systems 
to deepen the differences between 
groups and mobilise people around 
destructive agendas. Interest groups 
use these strategies to shift forms of 
ownership and control or to destabilise 
the situation in order to take economic 
advantage.
Within these conditions Africa has 
also been affected by a rise in other 
forms of extremism, including those 
developed around religious, faith 
based or identity related agendas. In 
an increasingly polarised world African 
conflicts are also influenced by the 
use of large-scale military operations 
in response to acts of violence, and to 
the use of fear tactics and terror, which 
often deepen divisions and fan the 
flames of conflict. 
Conditions are ripe in Africa for 
increasingly violent forms of conflict 
and a rise in extremism. This could 
become part of the strategy and tactics 
used by those who seek to undermine 
state institutions and structures. The 
increased militarisation of Africa and 
the growing military presence of the 
United States, through the Africa 
Command Structure AFRICOM, and 
direct military intervention by NATO 
allies in African conflicts, including 
France, Britain and other former 
colonial powers, is also a source of 
major concern that feeds into and fuels 
violent forms of conflict. The US now 
has a military presence in some 30 
African states. 
The accelerated scramble to control 
and exploit African mineral resources, 
under the banner of Africa as “the 
new frontier”, and the “new growth 
point, indeed the new playground”, 
has also raised the stakes for affected 
communities. Seldom accruing 
much benefit from the resource-
related development that takes place, 
communities are also often vulnerable 
to being relocated or to having natural 
resources such as forests and water, 
which are essential to their forms of 
livelihood, polluted or destroyed.
The phenomenon of rents and rent 
seeking in relation to natural resource 
exploitation, whereby related activities 
generate profits that are much higher 
than the minimum level of costs required 
to keep activities going, encourages 
the emergence of corrupt systems that 
undermine efforts to build stability. The 
mineral resource sector in particular 
creates the conditions for dysfunctional 
politics wherein instability becomes 
the self-serving paradigm of those who 
stand to gain economically from loose 
or non-existent regulatory mechanisms, 
and these exploiters include and involve 
both African and non-African external 
actors. 
In addition, natural resources 
provide an obvious source of financing 
for rebel groups who become trapped 
in war economies, and South Africa’s 
new-found focus on “an open for 
business” paradigm in foreign policy 
could fuel this culture of exploitation 
for the gain of small pockets of 
elites. Many African states endowed 
with an abundance of natural and 
other resources are turned into “war 
economies”, and instead of a positive 
asset, the possession of resources 
become a “curse”. This in turn is used 
by some to instigate and perpetuate 
cycles of violence and instability that use 
illicit resource accumulation to finance 
armed conflict. This encourages armed 
groups to secure access to and control 
over lucrative resource opportunities 
that are made more lucrative under 
unstable conditions.
Shifts in power at the global 
geopolitical level, and in Africa, have 
also accelerated the externally-driven 
scramble for resources. As China and 
other BRICS countries begin to assert 
a more aggressive economic presence 
in Africa, the previous dominance of 
traditional colonial powers, including 
France, the United Kingdom and other 
member states of the European Union, 
has been challenged. The economic 
opportunities that accompany political 
influence and resource control and the 
incentive this provides to work outside 
of weak and ineffectual systems cannot 
be delinked from the forces driving 
instability, inter-state conflicts and 
undemocratic or unconstitutional 
changes in leadership at national and 
local levels.
Ownership transfers and the 
accumulation of large-scale land tracts 
as well as changes in land ownership 
systems are also a source of conflict 
and a contributing factor to the conflict 
landscape. The further economic and 
social marginalisation of vulnerable 
communities that often accompanies 
land transfers exacerbates the 
conditions for escalated tension. 
These forms of conflict are becoming 
increasingly prevalent.
The democratisation agenda, and 
the rapid introduction of polarising 
forms of multi-party politics into systems 
that are not prepared to manage the 
resulting tensions also raises levels of 
tension. The heightened politicisation 
of all spheres of government which 
accompanies polarised party politics is 
often compounded when the private 
sector is weak and the state dominates 
most forms of economic activity. 
Escalated tensions and conflicts related 
to economic control, as well as within 
the relationship between the state 
and organised labour, and within the 
relations between the state, the private 
sector and industry also appear to be 
on the rise.
Current electoral models, including 
those that encourage a winner-takes-all 
approach and those focused on power 
politics that build support around 
personalities and identity or ethnicity 
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State failure to effectively deliver 
on social services also creates the 
conditions for violent forms of 
conflict linked to the mobilisation of 
a frustrated and dissatisfied citizenry. 
While this is often the result of a lack 
of capacity within the state, it is also 
sometimes caused by a deliberate 
intention to marginalise the needs 
of specific groups of people. These 
conflicts are also connected to a lack 
of transparency over how and why 
decisions are made, and a breakdown 
or absence of inclusive and effective 
dialogue processes.
The resulting tensions and the 
forms of community organisation that 
emerge around these structural and 
systemic failures, and the frustration 
and anger that accompanies the 
dominant unequal development 
trajectories of most African countries, is 
an important emerging form of conflict 
that requires urgent attention. The 
relationship between the state and its 
citizens is central to this element. The 
combination of economic migration, 
prejudice against migrant communities, 
tight competition for scarce resources 
and inadequate service delivery 
systems provide a further example of 
a rising conflict trend that needs to be 
more holistically addressed.
A key focus then on building the 
African Union, the Regional Economic 
Communities and the African Peace 
and Security Architecture of the AUC 
Peace and Security Department would 
seem to be essential if, as a solidarity 
lens suggests, the conflicts across the 
continent affect not only those directly 
involved but all of us as Africans.
The role South Africa plays out at an 
international diplomatic level in Africa 
should be fuelled by 4 key areas:
• dialogue and quiet diplomacy; 
• power sharing rather than a winner 
takes all system; 
• an approach to justice that is 
restorative rather than retributive or 
vindictive; and 
• building capable, developmental 
states in Africa.
 These four areas would all appear 
to be useful strategic responses to 
the above analysis that would also 
fit well within a longer term conflict 
transformation agenda.
 We are not convinced that a more 
robust assertion of a Human Rights 
agenda and the adoption of a moral 
high ground would prove any more 
effective at trying to curtail rights 
abuses and the exploitative use of 
power by undemocratic leaders. While 
we would support a more outspoken 
and principled stance against the abuse 
of power where it does occur we think 
an international relations approach in 
favour of mediated solutions to conflict 
may be more effective in the longer 
term than the megaphone diplomacy 
and carrying the big stick that some 
are calling for. But this approach also 
presupposes that South Africa will 
continue to commit to peace and 
security and helping to end deadly 
conflicts. 
 A potentially powerful strategy, 
not only for South Africa but for the 
continent as a whole, would involve 
connecting the international relations 
policy drivers to the need for African 
unity and an integrated African 
economy.  This would enable Africa to 
challenge and reform a global power 
structure that continues to marginalise 
African interests and to exploit the 
relative vulnerability of the continent, 
economically, politically and socially. 
Reform of the UN Security Council, 
and the building of South-South 
connections offers opportunities to 
challenge the historical global balance 
of power that has certainly not been 
very supportive of African interests to 
date.
 Finally, while clearly the current 
global economic trajectory, into which 
South Africa fits, is designed to benefit 
a predatory elite and not the majority, 
it is unlikely that any international 
relations agenda would enable South 
Africa to opt out of this system any 
time soon and choose an alternative 
economic path. Building alternative 
forms of power, through a multi-
lateral solidarity driven agenda, and 
strengthening international governance 
systems which could hold powers 
to account for their actions would 
appear to be a sound strategy for 
slowly shifting power. This could 
put in place the building blocks for 
propagating and driving alternative 
economic systems. These could 
be designed to achieve a major 
redistribution of the benefits currently 
accruing to only a few. 
While socio-economic imperatives 
of foreign policy remain vital and should 
be supported and welcomed, there is a 
broader agenda of peace and security, 
governance and democratisation, 
development, and international 
co-operation that should continue to 
inform South Africa’s foreign policy 
and diplomatic engagements. Civil 
society organisations and academic 
and research institutions should move 
away from a ‘holier than thou’ attitude, 
stop promoting the agendas of foreign 
governments and becoming more 
engaged as they interact with  the 
Department of International Relations 
and Co-operation (DIRCO), the 
Presidency and other agencies. They 
should strive to help to inform foreign 
policy without fearing co-option and 
loss of independence. They should 
think through how civic strategies 
might strengthen a more constructive 
agenda with short-term and long-term 
intentions.
As for government, it should 
guard against the dangers of pursuing 
elements of a narrow, self-interested, 
utilitarian foreign policy approach 
that is bent on serving the motives of 
small elites and adopt a more robust, 
thought-through approach. 
The government’s foreign policy 
should not be for sale to the highest 
bidder and for unethical contracts and 
deals. Values still have a vital role to 
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